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TRIGGERING AN OBLIGATION: RECEIPT OF AN EPA PRP
LETTER AND AN INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the "tragic consequences" of improper hazard-
ous waste disposal practices,' Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA"). 2 Congress's objectives in creating CERCLA were:
[T]o encourage maximum care and responsibility in the
handling of hazardous waste; to provide for rapid re-
sponse to environmental emergencies; to encourage vol-
untary clean-up of hazardous waste spills; . . . and to
ensure that parties responsible for release of hazardous
substances bear the costs of response and costs of damage
to natural resources.8
CERCLA authorizes the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") 4 to identify sites requiring cleanup and any
1. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 6119, 6120 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1016]. Prior to enactment of
CERCLA, Congress determined that the existing law was "clearly inadequate to
deal with this massive problem." Id at 18. Then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr., stated
that: The "public is already bearing more than its fair share of the cost of the
recklessness in the form of threats to the public health and damage to the public's
environment. What the public demands and what this bill ought to provide is a
fair and reasonable division of the cost of cleaning up the mess." Id.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA") Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 §§ 101-405 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359-60
(1986) (stating that CERCLA "seeks to facilitate government cleanup of hazardous
waste discharges and prevention of future releases.");J.V. Peters & Co. v. Adminis-
trator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
Courts enforce CERCLA as a remedial statute, construing it liberally to effec-
tively satisfy its remedial objectives. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) (illustrating that "Congress enacted a broad remedial
statute designed to enhance the authority of the EPA to respond effectively and
promptly to toxic pollutant spills that threaten[ ] the environment and human
health."). See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d
1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986); NewJersey v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 821
F. Supp. 999, 1003 (D.NJ. 1993).
4. Congress granted the power of executing CERCLA to the President, but in
1981 President Reagan delegated that authority to EPA. See Exec. Order No.
12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981).
(479)
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parties potentially liable for any remedial action5 necessary to re-
pair the environmental damage.6 Upon obtaining sufficient evi-
dence of a party's potential CERCLA liability, EPA sends a letter
advising the party of its classification as a "potentially responsible
party" ("PRP").7 Courts are split as to whether an insured's receipt
of a PRP letter triggers an insurer's duty to defend the insured re-
cipient under an applicable insurance policy. The dispute focuses
on whether a PRP letter is the functional equivalent to the filing of
a lawsuit. Insurance companies' use of the standard comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") insurance policy further complicates the
issue and frequently leads to litigation because of ambiguities in
various CGL terms.8
5. Section 101 (24) defines "remedy" or "remedial action" as:
those actions consistent with* permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment.
CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (24).
6. To help finance investigations and cleanups at uncontrolled or abandoned
hazardous waste sites, Congress established a special tax that goes into the Hazard-
ous Substance Response Trust Fund ("Superfund"). In 1986, CERCLA was
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675), which significantly amended various sections
of CERCLA, including increasing the size of the Superfund from $1.6 billion to
$8.5 billion. SARA § 207(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9611. Generally, the fund is to be used
for the "[playment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to section
9604.... Id. § 111 (a)(1), § 9611 (a) (1). President Reagan also delegated primary
authority under SARA to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(1987).
7. See generally Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations and Informa-
tion Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg. 5298 (1988). State environmental agencies enforcing
hazardous waste cleanups have similar notices that are commonly sent to PRPs.
For further discussion of PRP letters, see infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
8. A large number of cases address the issue of the definition of "property
damages" as used in Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policies. See, e.g.,
Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri v. Continental Ins. Co., 488 U.S. 821
(1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. Ltd.,
804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986). Other cases discuss the definition of "sudden and
accidental" as used in CGL pollution exclusion clauses. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.
Ct. 78 (1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich.
1991); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989) (illus-
trating that various terms have ambiguous meanings); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989),
appeal denied, 545 N.E. 2d 133 (Ill. 1989); International Minerals & Chem. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 762-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 530
N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1988). See generally Kristin A. Kolesar, Note, Insurance Coverage for
2
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DuT' TO DEFEND
This Comment focuses solely on the "duty to defend any suit"
clause present in many CGL policies. The analysis herein addresses
whether the term "suit," as used in the policy, includes actions or
investigations initiated as a result of receipt of a PRP letter.9 After
extensive background discussion, this Comment illustrates poten-
tial problems caused by a lack of consistency in judicial analysis of
this issue and suggests combining administrative, legislative, and ju-
dicial efforts to promote and mandate joint insurer and PRP in-
volvement in CERCLA liability negotiations. This approach would
allow those companies involved to assist in cleaning up hazardous
waste sites, rather than delaying cleanup efforts through prelimi-
nary litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The CERCLA Enforcement Scheme
Under CERCLA, hazardous waste site cleanups can take any
one of three forms. First, a PRP, or group of PRPs, may voluntarily
elect to clean up a site and thereby avoid administrative enforce-
ment altogether. 10 Second, EPA may choose to clean the site itself,
using federal funds from Superfund,11 and seek reimbursement
from liable parties. 12 Finally, if "an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment"
exists, under CERCLA section 106, EPA may seek injunctive relief
CERCLA Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies & Cleaning Up Hazard-
ous Waste in the Legal Environmen 68 NoTRE DAmE L. REV. 549 (1993).
9. For purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that the insurer's duty to de-
fend an insured would otherwise exist, expressly or impliedly, but for an exclusion
based on the definition of "suit."
10. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). Some critics seek to have volun-
tary cleanups dealt with more directly under CERCLA. See How Can Voluntary Clean-
ups Get Results?, 9 ENVrL. F. 26, 26-32 (Nov./Dec. 1992).
11. CERCLA § 104(a) states in part:
Whenever... any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment,.., the President is author-
ized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or
arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to
such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time.., or
take any other response measure consistent with the national contin-
gency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment.
CEROLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
12. CEROLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A). "[A]ny person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to [a site] ... from
which there is a release... caus[ing] the incurrence of response costs... shall be
liable for... all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government...." Id. For further discussion of potential liability under CERCLA,
see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
1994]
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by issuing an administrative order requiring PRPs to undertake the
cleanup themselves.' 3
Since 1989, EPA has increased its use of section 106 adminis-
trative orders.' 4 Penalties for groundless noncompliance with ad-
ministrative orders include fines of up to $25,000 per day15 and/or
treble damages based on the cost incurred by the use of Superfund
monies. 16 In order to avoid these penalties, PRPs must demon-
strate a reasonable belief that there was sufficient cause to justify a
refusal to comply with an order.'7
13. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). CERCLA § 106(a) states in rele-
vant part:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance
from a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States
to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat,
and the district court of the United States in the district in which the
threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public in-
terest and the equities of the case may require.
Id.
There are two types of CERCLA § 106 administrative orders: consent orders,
which formalize removal and Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ("RI/FS")
settlements, and unilateral orders, which obligate PRPs to perform certain removal
actions. See Guidance on CERCLA § 106(a) Unilateral Administrative Orders for Reme-
dial Designs and Remedial Actions, 20 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35253, 35253
(Jan. 31, 1990). Accordingly, EPA regional offices are to issue orders to those
PRPs only when evidence exists indicating they are in fact liable. However, individ-
ual EPA offices can determine the degree of fact specificity necessary to show lia-
bility. Id. at 35256. Regional offices are directed to consider the financial position
of PRPs prior to issuing a § 106 administrative order because a "reasonable belief"
that the PRPs are financially capable of conducting remedial action is required.
Id. Exceptions to this requirement are made for those PRPs "lack[ing] any substan-
tial resources" when remedial actions "do not involve expenditures of money." Id.
14. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
15. CERCLA § 106(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1). A court recently assessed
fines for a PRP's failure to comply with a § 104 information request in the amount
of $100,000 in penalties and an additional $590,000 for reimbursement to EPA for
past costs. PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEM. NEws (June 16, 1993). The largest penalty
assessed for a CERCLA § 104 violation was a $12.4 million penalty charged against
a Texas businessman in December 1992. Toxic MATERALS NEws (Jan. 20, 1993).
That penalty represented the maximum $25,000 per day fine for the 499-day pe-
riod that the defendant failed to respond to the information request. Id.
16. CERCLA § 107(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (3). The monies recovered
under this section are deposited into the Superfund. Id. Aside from the economic
gain and punitive effect associated with being awarded treble damages, EPA views
treble damages as an additional deterrence to potential violators. See Superfund
Enforcement Strategy and Implementation Plan, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
35,207, 35,208 (Sept. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Superfund Enforcement Strategy].
17. CERCLA § 106(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1). "[T]reble damages may
not be assessed if the party opposing such damages had an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that the EPA's order was either invalid or inapplicable to it."
Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. V. p. 479
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss2/7
1994] DU=y TO DEFEND 483
Section 107 of CERCLA lists four classes of personsI8 consid-
ered potentially responsible parties: (1) current owners and opera-
tors' 9 of a vessel or facility;20 (2) owners and operators of facilities
at the time of hazardous substances disposal;2 ' (3) persons who ar-
ranged for disposal, 22 treatment,23 or transport2 4 of hazardous sub-
stances; and (4) persons who transported hazardous substances to a
site where there was a release or threatened release. 25
Corrective response actions26 can be in the form of short-term
removal actions2 7 or long-term remedial actions.28 Removal actions
are more limited, usually costing less than two million dollars or
18. "Person" is broadly defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, consortium,joint venture, commercial entity, United States Gov-
ernment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
19. Id. § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A). CERCLA § 101 (20) (A) states
in part:
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any per-
son owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the
case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control
of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government,
any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at
such facility immediately beforehand.
Id.
20. Id. § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). The term "facility" includes "any build-
ing, structure, installation, equipment,... landfill, storage container .... " Id.
21. Id. § 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). The Code of Federal Regulations
lists all hazardous substances included under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4.
Courts have found that CERCLA does not consider quantitative amounts in defin-
ing hazardous substances for purposes of... determining PRP liability. See, e.g.,
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 1992); City of
New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
liability under CERCLA attaches regardless of concentration levels).
22. CERCLA § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 101(26), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(26).
25. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
26. See CERCLA § 101 (25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (25).
27. Id. § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). Removal actions include "security
fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies,
temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals .... " Id.
28. Id. § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Remedial actions include: "storage,
confinement, perimeter protection .... neutralization, cleanup of released hazard-
ous substances.., diversion, destruction,... repair or replacement... and any
monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public
health and welfare and the environment." Id.
5
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lasting less than twelve months.29 Remedial actions may be taken
instead of, or in addition to, removal actions.30
Remedial actions begin with a Remedial Investigation/Feasibil-
ity Study ("RI/FS"), which assesses site conditions and determines
the type and extent of cleanup necessary at a site.3 ' The study can
be conducted either by EPA or by PRPs if EPA determines that a
PRP-controlled RI/FS can be completed properly.32 EPA oversees
all PRP remedial studies to ensure compliance with EPA standards,
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan ("NCP") requirements,33 administrative orders, and consent
decrees.3 4 The remedial investigation phase may take years to com-
plete and typically includes site characterization, field investiga-
tions, treatability studies, and risk assessments.35 The feasibility
study evaluates alternative response actions proposed in the reme-
dial investigation phase.36 Identifying the economically and envi-
ronmentally appropriate action is of paramount importance given
the already high and ever-increasing costs of CERCLA cleanup.37
After completion of the RI/FS, actual cleanup begins. Under
CERCLA, any party, including EPA, that incurs response costs may
29. Id. § 104(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1). There are several exceptions to
these limitations, including the need to continue the response to alleviate an im-
mediate risk. Id.
30. CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
31. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.430(a) (2) (1992). "Developing and conducting an
RI/FS generally includes the following activities: project scoping, data collection,
risk assessment, treatability studies, and analysis of alternatives." Id.
32. CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). When a PRP enters into an
agreement to perform remedial actions under CERCLA § 106, the agreement
must be "entered in the appropriate United States district court as a consent de-
cree." Id § 122(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). Section 122(d)(1)(A) also
stipulates that entering a consent decree is not equal to an admission of liability
and can not be admitted in a judicial or administrative proceeding. Id.
33. 40 C.F.RL pt. 300 (1992). The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") is the
primary guidance document for CERCLA and sets forth standards and procedures
which EPA or private parties must follow in selecting and conducting response
actions. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.1; see CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
34. EPA, Guidance on Oversight of Potentially Responsible Party Remedial Investiga-
tions and Feasibility Studies - Final Volume 1 1-2 to 1-3 (July 1991). "Overall, EPA is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that the response actions taken at a site protect
human health and the environment and meet statutory requirements for response
actions." Id. at 1-3.
35. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.430(d).
36. Id. pt. 300.430(e).
37. See J. GORDON ARBUcKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 279
(12th ed. 1993). The average cost of cleaning up a National Priority List ("NPL")
site is $25-30 million. WilliamJ. Hamel, Time to Reurite a Bad Law, TEx. LAw., Aug.
2, 1993, at 18. The rise in CERCLA costs is partially due to the stricter clean-up
standards imposed by the 1986 CERCLA amendments. ARBucKIL, supra, at 279.
6
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seek reimbursement from other PRPs.38 PRPs may be liable for the
costs incurred in any of the removal or remedial actions taken, 9
other "necessary costs... consistent with the [NCP],"40 damages for
the injury to or loss of natural resources,41 and the costs of any nec-
essary health studies.42 While CERCLA does provide limitations on
liability, these limits are extremely high and therefore are of little
practical value to most CERCLA defendants. 43
Avoiding CERCLA liability is difficult for three reasons. First,
Congress incorporated into CERCLA only very limited affirmative
defenses. 44 Second, courts construe CERCLA as imposing strict lia-
38. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
39. Id. § 9607(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A).
40. Id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
41. Id § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C).
42. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (D).
43. See id. § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c). CERCLA damage limitations de-
pend on the nature of the "vessel" or "facility" carrying or holding the released
hazardous substance. Id. § 107(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1). For example, the
"limitation" applicable to most facilities (excluding sea-going vessels and motor
vehicles) allows a recovery ceiling of "the total of all costs of response plus
$50,000,000 for any damages under this subchapter." Id. In any event, the limita-
tions are inapplicable to owners or operators who have engaged in willful miscon-
duct, willful negligence, violation of standards or regulations, or failure or refusal
to cooperate with government officials. Id. § 107(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (2).
Under CERCLA, the federal government can obtain a lien on property to
satisfy liability for costs or judgment against a PRP. Id. § 107() (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(o (1). The property attached must belong to the PRP and must be subject
to or affected by a removal or remedial action. Id.
44. PRPs have an affirmative defense to CERCLA liability if they can show the
release was caused by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with
the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned.., and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions....
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
Most courts have restricted the available CERCLA defenses to those enumer-
ated in the statute. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys.,
Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990) (preventing use of "unclean hands" de-
fense under CERCLA), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); United States v. Atlas Min-
erals & Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (rejecting equitable
defenses); Mathis v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 971, 974 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
But see United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D 460, 463 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (keeping
open possibility of other affirmative defenses); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs. Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 589 F. Supp 1437, 1448 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
7
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bility on PRPs.45 Consequently, courts will hold a PRP liable if. (1)
there is evidence of the presence of a hazardous substance at a site,
and (2) the PRP deposited the same type of substance at that site
anytime prior to the investigation.46 Third, without express statu-
tory authorization, courts impose joint and several liability on PRPs
when the damage is not divisible.4 7 Joint and several liability cre-
ates the possibility that a PRP may be solely or primarily liable for
an enormously expensive cleanup, even if the evidence clearly indi-
cates that the PRP was only marginally responsible for the hazard-
ous condition.48
With few exceptions, CERCLA limits federal court jurisdiction
to hear challenges by PRPs to EPA response actions or administra-
tive orders.49 A PRP is virtually unable to seek judicial review of
45. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 161 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042
(2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable,
even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the com-
promise."); J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding that CERCLA § 107 imposes form of strict liability); Stewman
v. Mid-South Wood Prods. of Mena, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 611, 615 (W.D. Ark. 1992)
(stating that liability under CERCLA is generally strict).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
"The only required nexus between the defendant and the site is that the defendant
have dumped his waste there and that the hazardous substances found in the de-
fendant's waste are also found at the site." Id.; see also City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 480 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that "fingerprinting" of
waste not required).
47. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that Con-
gress intended that federal courts develop uniform approach governing joint and
several liability), cert. denied sub no. American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 493 U.S.
1071 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171-73; United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (comparing Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 433A, which states that tortfeasors may only be liable for
their contribution when the harm is divisible, to § 875, which provides for joint
and several liability); see also United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1256 (S.D. 111. 1984) (imposing joint and several liability, although it would be
"extremely harsh and unfair if imposed on a defendant who contributed only a
small amount of waste to a site.").
A PRP can defeat the imposition ofjoint and several liability only by establish-
ing that the harm is divisible. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691
F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See generally Superfund Enforceent Strategy,
supra note 16, at 35,208.
48. See, e.g., William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical
Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413,
10,423 (July 1991).
49. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Courts generally hold that
§ 113(h) removes from their jurisdiction those challenges of EPA actions not ex-
plicitly made available for pre-enforcement review. E.g., Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1388 (5th Cir. 1989); Barmet Aluminum
Corp. v. Thomas, 730 F. Supp. 771, 773-74 (W.D. Ky. 1990), aff'd, 927 F.2d 289
(6th Cir. 1991).
8
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EPA actions until EPA institutes an enforcement action.50 Courts
normally uphold EPA response action decisions unless the adminis-
trative record alone 51 shows the EPA action to be "arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law."
52
B. EPA CERCLA Enforcement Policies
EPA has attempted to reach its goal of negotiated settlements
of all CERCLA-covered waste sites through settlements, administra-
tive orders, and litigation.53 In 1989, EPA announced a policy pro-
viding for more aggressive CERCLA enforcement 5 4 The new
policy, coined "enforcement first," sought to substantially increase
the use of administrative orders against PRPs, aggressively obtain
information about hazardous waste sites and persons that may be
categorized as PRPs, and improve cost recovery policies.55 The ob-
50. The legislative history behind CERCLA § 113 illustrates Congressional in-
tent to prevent pre-enforcement review. See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 81 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2863, 2930 ("[S]ection [113] is intended
to codify the current position of the Administrator and the Department ofJustice
with respect to pre-enforcement review- there is no right ofjudicial review of the
Administrator's selection and implementation of response actions until after the
response action [sic] have been completed... ."); see also Dickerson v. Administra-
tor, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1987). The purpose of precluding judi-
cial review is to prevent "piecemeal review and excessive delay of cleanup."
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043, 1055 (D. Kan. 1987).
51. CERCLA § 113(j) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1). The lead agency control-
ling a cleanup establishes an administrative record which contains the documents
forming the basis for the selection of a response action. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.800(a).
The contents of that record include the data and analysis used to select a response
action, documents used to prepare the RI/FS, public comments, administrative
orders and consent decrees, and other documents that form a basis for the selec-
tion. Id. pt. 300.810(a).
52. CERCLA § 113(j) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j) (2). See also United States v. Sey-
mour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
53. Superfund Enforcement Strategy, supra note 16, at 35,207.
54. This policy evolved from an internal EPA management review report on
the Superfund program conducted in 1989. See E.p.A., A Management Review of the
Superfund Program, (June 1989) [hereinafter Management Review]. The internal re-
view was performed as a result of then-EPA Administrator Reilly's admitted lack of
knowledge of Superfund's management and progress at his Senate confirmation
hearings. Id. at Administrator's Preface.
55. Id. at 1-15. In a Senate subcommittee hearing following the completion
of the internal management review, then-EPA Administrator Reilly told the
subcommittee:
Superfund is being redirected to be an "enforcement first" program.
Our objective is to get responsible parties to do the majority of the clean-
ups. This means that EPA will aggressively use the coercive enforcement
tools at its disposal, while at the same time expanding its use of the settle-
ment tools that are also available in the law. We will move to quickly get
enforceable cleanup agreements with the responsible parties or failing
such cooperation, immediately order them to conduct work. At the same
time, we will continue to conduct removals and to maintain a vigorous
1994]
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jective of the new policy was twofold. First, it sought to have PRPs
undertake cleanups of hazardous waste sites thereby reducing use
of Superfund monies. Second, the policy encouraged issuance of
section 106(a) administrative orders to PRPs who fail to voluntarily
undertake cleanup action prior to EPA action.56 Although aware of
EPA's ability to compel PRP compliance through litigation, EPA
planners preferred to avoid judicial remedies due to the possibility
of lengthy delays and the risk of adverse judicial outcomes.57
C. Procedural and Substantive Considerations in PRP
Notification
Identifying and locating PRPs is an integral part of enforcing
CERCLA. Notices of potential liability are sent to PRPs when suffi-
cient preliminary evidence exists demonstrating potential CERCLA
section 107 liability.58 If there is insufficient evidence to establish
potential liability, EPA may send a PRP a questionaire requesting
specific information pursuant to CERCLA section 104(e). 59 These
questionnaires pose difficult problems for PRPs; questionnaire re-
sponses may divulge incriminating evidence either against the re-
cipient or other companies named therein.6° However, the
responding PRP may incur penalties for failing to respond fully and
accurately.61
program of government conducted cleanups .... We will promptly pur-
sue private parties to recover the Fund costs.
Oversight of the EPA's Management Review of the Superfund Program, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (June 15, 1989). Also testifying at the hearing was Jonathan Cannon, Acting
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, who testified
that he "[thought] it [ ] important to keep in mind that [ ] settlements are driven by
the threat of carrying enforcement actions full term." Id.
56. Management Review, supra note 54, at 2-2. See also Superfund Enforcement
Strategy, supra note 16, at 35,208.
57. Id. at 35,208.
58. See Superfund Program, Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotia-
tions and Information Exchange, 5a Fed. Reg. 5298, 5301 (1988) [hereinafter Gui-
dance on Notice]. Through the use of civil investigators and EPA staff, "PRP
searches" are routinely conducted, pursuant to EPA guidelines, to locate all PRPs
and acquire information dealing with the specific sites. See EPA PRP Search Man-
ual (Aug. 1987). EPA consistently seeks to strengthen the agency's PRP search
capabilities, acknowledging that these capabilities are the cornerstone of successful
clean-up attempts. See Superfund Enforcement Strategy, supra note 16, at 35,209.
59. CERCLA § 104(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e).
60. Congress granted EPA authority to send investigatory correspondences
under CERCLA § 104(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1). These "104(e) information
requests" require the recipient to provide information or produce records regard-
ing hazardous waste shipments or disposal. Id.
61. Penalties include fines of up to $25,000 per day. CERCLA § 106(b) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1).
10
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Pursuant to CERCLA section 122(e), EPA may send a PRP one
of two types of notice letters, either general or special, to advise
them of their status as a PRP.6 2 Although provided with general
substantive and procedural guidelines, individual EPA regional of-
fices have discretion in determining which type of notice to send.63
In addition, regional offices may elect to send a section 104(e) in-
formation request prior to, or accompanied by, a section 122(e)
notice letter.64 The almost autonomous nature of the various EPA
regional offices results in PRP letters which are not uniformly
drafted; individual regions have approached investigations and ne-
gotiations differently.
Depending on the size and nature of the required cleanup,
recipients of PRP letters have several options. They may initiate a
cleanup on their own, negotiate with EPA on possible response ac-
tions, or seek assistance from their insurers. Another more drastic
option is to ignore the EPA notice letter and force the government
to use Superfund monies to clean the site and later sue to recover
those costs.6
5
EPA could encounter serious obstacles if multiple PRPs in-
volved in a single CERCLA cleanup each choose different responses
to the EPA notice. EPA may, however, encourage united PRP ac-
tion by forming a PRP steering committee. Through such a com-
mittee, EPA can negotiate collectively with the PRPs and implement
62. Guidance on Notice, supra note 58, at 5299. Components of a general
notice letter include: (1) notification of potential liability for response costs; (2)
discussion about future notices and possibility of future use of a special notice; (3)
general discussion about differing site response activities; (4) a request for addi-
tional information regarding the site in question; (5) discussion about the merits
of forming a PRP steering committee; (6) notice of establishment of an administra-
tive record; and (7) deadlines for response to the notice. Id. at 5307. Components
of a special notice are similar to those of general notices but also contain: (1) a
copy of a workplan and draft consent decree; (2) a discussion of what constitutes
good faith; (3) a demand for payment of EPA costs incurred to date pursuant to
§ 107(a) plus interest; and (4) identification of actions taken and the costs of the
actions and notice of the anticipation of expending additional fund monies. Id.
The special notice letter triggers formal negotiations between EPA and the PRP
and prohibits EPA from taking §§ 104(a) or 106 response actions for 60 days after
receipt of the notice. Id. If the PRP responds with a good faith attempt to negoti-
ate, no response action is taken. Id. at 5299.
For an illustration of a sample request of information letter and sample PRP
letter see LAWRENCE P. SCHNAPF, ENViRoNmENTAL LBnmr, LAW AND STRATEGY FOR
BusmEss AND CORPORArlONS, Vol. 2, pt. 2, app. A, B (1990).
63. Guidance on Notice, supra note 58, at 5300.
64. Id. at 5299.
65. For a discussion of PRP and EPA responses under CERCLA, see supra
notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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uniform remedial and removal actions in a more effective and ex-
peditious manner.66
D. Insurance Considerations and the Duty to Defend
As environmental laws have been enacted, the insurance indus-
try has responded with a variety of liability limiting clauses. 67
Although parties may insure against CERCLA liability,68 strict and
retroactive CERCLA liability exposes an insured to an inestimable
magnitude of risk.69 Obviously, insurers faced with huge CERCLA
claims seek to avoid covering the liability and associated costs.
Avoiding coverage of CERCLA claims depends primarily on
whether the policy language is interpreted to encompass environ-
mental losses. A commonly-used standard CGL policy states in part:
[T] he company shall have the right and duty to defend any
suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall
not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to de-
fend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's
liability (under the CGL policy) has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements.70
Although several terms used throughout the CGL policy are de-
fined within the policy itself, an overwhelming majority of policies
66. Those PRPs at specific hazardous waste sites who decide to negotiate a
settlement with EPA or perform the cleanup themselves usually form a PRP steer-
ing committee to facilitate negotiations and communications with EPA.
67. See Hendrick & Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms -An Intro-
duction and Citique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. CoUrs. Q. 319 (1986). The revised CGL
now excludes liability coverage for "'bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising
out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
pollutants." Id. at 346-47. A pollution exclusion was also incorporated into the
CGL, limiting coverage to "sudden and accidental" occurrences only. Id. at 344.
68. CERCLA § 107(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1).
69. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLuM. L. REv. 942, 958 (1988) (warning that unanticipated dangers may result in
unexpected future liability). For a discussion of CERCLA's retroactivity, see infra
note 92.
70. 1973 CGL (emphasis added). The CGL was created by a task force of
combined insurance rating associations - the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau
("MIRB") and the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters ("NBCU"). Catherine
M. Ward, NJ. L. J., (Oct. 24, 1991), at 54. See generally 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAw & PRAancICF § 4491 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (discussing development and con-
struction of liability policies).
12
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now in effect do not define the term "suit." It is this ambiguity that
is at the center of the dispute between insureds and insurers, which
is the topic of this Comment.
Courts recognize that the duty to defend an insured against a
claim is separate from and broader than the duty to indemnify an
insured for losses.7 ' Generally, courts construe insurance contracts
liberally, resolving all ambiguities in favor of the insured.72 There
are at least two reasons for such a rule: (1) insurers draft the poli-
cies' language and therefore should not benefit from ambiguities in
the contract; and (2) the ultimate purpose of insurance coverage is
to protect the insured.73 However, despite the presumption in
favor of the insured, courts will not disregard express language be-
cause of an alleged ambiguity.74 A court may be bound to define
ambiguous terms based on precedent.7 5 As with other contracts,
insurance contracts must be construed to effectuate the parties'
intent. 76
71. E.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d 1489,
1490 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[A]n insurer may incur a duty to defend its insured even
though it ultimately may not have an obligation to indemnify any liability that may
be found against the insured."); Security State Bank of Kansas City v. Aetna Casu-
al & Sur. Co., 825 F. Supp. 944, 946 (D. Kan. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vavasour,
79 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (reasoning that duties to indemnify are not
coextensive with duties to defend); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575
N.E.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. 1991). See also R. KEETON & A. Wmiss, INSURANCE LAW
§ 9.1(b), at 988 (1988).
72. E.g., Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 736 (1st Cir. 1990);
Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (D. Kan. 1993)
(holding that insurance contracts are generally construed against the insurer);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 930
(Ill. 1991) (proposing resolution of all ambiguities in favor of insured); Farm Bu-
reau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Old Hickory Casualty Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 283, 286 (Kan. 1991).
See generally David S. Miller, Note, Insurance As Contract: The Argument For Aban-
doning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988).
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, insurance companies
must be "clear and unambiguous in creating limitations on coverage." American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
73. Coakley Landfill, Inc. v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 618 A.2d 777, 782
(N.H. 1992).
74. Alfin, Inc. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting
that courts will not disregard express language); Thomas v. Thomas, 824 P.2d 971,
977 (Kan. 1992); Lacaze v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (La. Ct. App.
1986).
75. 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAw & PRACTICE § 7404 (1979 & Supp. 1992).
See also Coakley Landfl, 618 A.2d at 781. Courts adhere to judicial precedent even
if the court finds a term susceptible to other interpretations. Stein-McMurray Ins.,
Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 520 P.2d 865, 867 (Idaho 1974) (citing 17A C.J.S. Con-
tracts § 300 (1963 & Supp. 1993)).
76. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (E.D.N.Y. 1988);
Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 840 P.2d 456, 459 (Kan. 1992).
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As a general rule, if the claims asserted against an insured po-
tentially fall within a policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to
defend against the claims. 77 Therefore, in terms of a PRP letter,
courts must consider whether a reasonable PRP would view receipt
of an EPA letter as triggering the insurer's duty to defend under
the standard CGL policy.78
III. CASE ANAL-YSIS
Courts are split on whether an insurer's duty to defend is trig-
gered by an insured's receipt of a PRP letter.79 The current trend is
to broaden traditional definitions of the term "suit" to encompass
receipt of PRP letters.80 Courts finding that the duty to defend is
not triggered by receipt of a PRP letter have relied on the plain
language of the CGL policy in holding that the term "suit" is unam-
biguous and applies only to actions involving a court of law.8'
Under the reasonable expectation doctrine, courts construe an insurance pol-
icy in accordance with the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.
Okadav. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 281 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[E]xamin[e] the
entire contract to ascertain and fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties.").
See also Miller, supra note 72, at 1849 n.1.
77. American Motorist Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d 1489, 1490
(10th Cir. 1991) (adding that some courts look beyond pleadings and consider rel-
evant facts); EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 905 F.2d 8, 11
(2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that courts consider allegations "arguably or poten-
tially" leading a reasonable person to believe claims are covered by policy); Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1993).
The duty to defend may also arise prior to the filing of a suit. KEETON &
Wmiss, supra note 71, § 9.1(c), at 989. For example, the duty may arise when a
third party advises the insurer directly of an occurrence, when the insured makes a
request, or when a third party makes a claim without filing a suit. Id.
78. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 71, § 9.1, at 990.
79. Most cases involving an insurance company's refusal to defend commence
with an insured filing a declaratory judgment action. In those circumstances the
insured asks the court to "declare" that the rights and duties under the policy
include the duty to defend once a PRP letter has been received. E.g., Avondale
Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 906 (1990); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 62
(W.D. Mich. 1989). Occasionally, insurance companies will initiate declaratory
judgment actions. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d
1507, 1510 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. See generally Thomas A. Gordon & Roger Westendorf, Liability Coverage for
Toxic Tort, Hazardous Waste Disposal and Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAmo L. Rv.
567, 609 (1988).
81. Cases finding no duty to defend include: Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731
(1st Cir. 1990); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Re-
sources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1989); Detrex Chem. Indus.,
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Patrons
Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990); City of Edgerton v. Gen-
14
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Courts finding that the duty to defend is triggered have broadly
defined "suit" to include administrative claims, such as the receipt
of a PRP letter, citing the adversarial nature of the situation to sup-
port their interpretation.8 2 Michigan's state and federal courts
have issued several opinions on this issue that demonstrate the judi-
cial dichotomy.8 3 These opinions are discussed below.
A. Michigan Courts' Analysis of the CGL Policy and the Duty to
Defend
1. Federal Courts
Two 1989 Michigan federal district court opinions illustrateju-
dicial divisiveness over the effect of a PRP letter on an insurer's duty
to defend. In Harter Corp. v. Home Indeminity Co.8 4 and Arco Indus-
tries Corp. v. Travelers Insurance Co.,85 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan held that a PRP letter is
not the equivalent of a "suit" triggering an insurer's duty to de-
fend.86 The Harter and Arco courts emphasized that "suite refers to
court proceedings, not investigative EPA actions where no com-
plaint or administrative orders have yet been filed.87 However, in
eral Casualty Co., 493 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Professional Rental, Inc. v.
Shelby Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
82. Cases finding that receipt of a PRP letter triggers the insurer's duty to
defend include: Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1991); Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775 F.
Supp. 718 (D. Vt. 1991); American Motorist v. Levelor Lorentzan, No. 88-1994,
1988 WL 112142 (D.NJ. 1988); Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 697
F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff', 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 906 (1990); A.Y. McDonald Indus. Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475
N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1991); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990); Coakley Landfill, Inc. v. Maine Bonding &
Casualty Co., 618 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1992); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial
Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal
denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (IIl. 1989).
83. For a discussion of the split between courts in Michigan, see infra notes
84-104 and accompanying text.
84. 713 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
85. 730 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mich. 1989). In Arco, the insured received a PRP
letter which informed them as to the extent of their potential liability under CER-
CLA and requested participation in a RI/FS. The letter also required Arco to pro-
vide information regarding the hazardous waste disposal site at issue. Id. at 62.
86. Harter, 713 F. Supp. at 233; Arco, 730 F. Supp. at 62. The Harter court
found the term "suit to be unambiguous and held that it referred to a court pro-
ceeding, which did not include a PRP letter. Harter, 713 F. Supp. at 233. The Arco
court reaffirmed the decision in Harter and refused to find the insurer had a duty
to defend. Arco, 730 F. Supp. at 68. The court determined EPA's actions to be
investigative since no complaints or administrative orders were filed. Id.
87. Arco, 730 F. Supp. at 62; Harter, 713 F. Supp. at 233.
19941
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both Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund, Inc.88 and Ray Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,89 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan reached the opposite conclusion, de-
termining that a PRP letter effectively institutes a "suit" and thus
triggers the duty to defend.90
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at-
tempted to resolve this split at the district coury level in Ray Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.91 In that case, the Sixth
Circuit held that receipt of a PRP letter does not trigger the in-
surer's duty to defend.92 Ray Industries involved an insured who re-
ceived a PRP letter from EPA advising the insured that it may be
jointly and severally liable for the costs of studying and remediating
a hazardous waste site.93 The insured unsuccessfully sought a de-
fense from the insurance company. The insured argued that the
insurer had a duty to defend because: (1) civil penalties and puni-
tive damages may be assessed if the insured failed to disclose infor-
mation or otherwise respond; (2) judicial review may not be sought
for EPA actions until after a cost recovery suit; and (3) a reviewing
court is statutorily limited to the administrative record prepared by
EPA.94 The insured also contended that contesting EPA's claim
would open a crucial period of discovery in which the insured
would have to submit evidence for the administrative record.95
The Ray Industries court, relying on the principle that unambig-
uous terms in a policy are given their ordinary meaning, found
"suit" to mean "formal legal proceedings, as opposed to demands
and other tactics."96 However, the court acknowledged the serious-
ness of a PRP letter. According to the court, the PRP letter may
88. 730 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
89. 728 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
90. See Higgins Indus. v. Fireman's Fund, 730 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
Ray Industries, 728 F. Supp. at 1310. For a further discussion of Ray Industries, see
infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
91. 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 761. Following this decision, the Sixth Circuit twice reaffirmed its
position, but did not report either opinion. See Hi-Mill Mfg. Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., No. 92-1351, 1993 WL 76922 (6th Cir. 1993); Central Quality Servs.
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 90-1991, 1992 WL 296718 (6th Cir. 1992).
93. Ray Industries, 974 F.2d at 757.
94. Id. at 759.
95. Id. Commentators have also noted that the defense of an insured PRP
may best be served with the insurer's active involvement, once the possibility of an
eventual suit is indicated, to prevent the weakening of a worthy defense. See Kuu-
TON & WIDiss, supra note 71, § 9.1(c), at 989.
96. Ray Industries, 974 F.2d at 761. In defining the term "suit," the court re-
cited definitions from Webster's and Black's dictionaries to illustrate the assertion
that a suit necessarily involves legal proceedings in a court. Id.
16
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"even represent a unique legal creation, with no true parallel in any
other area of administrative law."97
2. State Courts
Without Michigan Supreme Court guidance on the issue,
Michigan's lower state courts have split on whether a PRP letter
triggers a duty to defend.98 However, on August 31, 1993, the Mich-
igan Supreme Court agreed to hear appeal in Michigan Millers Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Bronson Plating Co.99 The forthcoming decision
may resolve the issue that forced lower Michigan state courts and
federal courts to speculate as to how the Michigan Supreme Court
would rule if confronted with the issue.100
The facts in Michigan Millers Mutual are typical of cases address-
ing this issue. An insured received a PRP letter from EPA, which
demanded information regarding a hazardous waste site and di-
rected the PRP to undertake an RI/FS study. The letter also
warned that failing to comply could result in enforcement action,
assessment of fines, or an injunctive order.101 The Michigan Court
97. Id. at 764.
98. E.g., Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 447 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 476 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. 1991). In Polkow, Michigan's
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") and EPA separately initiated the ad-
ministrative actions leading to the litigation. Under those circumstances, the court
found that "subjecting the insured to administrative mechanisms mandating an
environmental investigation and cleanup, backed by the power to expose the in-
sured to a money judgment in a court of law, amounts to a 'suit' for purposes of
invoking the coverage of the policy." Id. at 856. In United States Aviex Co. v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. CL App. 1983) [hereinafter Aviex], the same
court held that the duty to defend any suit depended on the definition of "dam-
ages" and that "damages" included money spent in complying with the orders of
the state DNR. Aviex, 336 N.W.2d at 842. The court further reasoned that an insur-
ance company's duty to defend would be clear if the PRP was sued to recover
"traditional" damages. Id. at 843. Specifically, the court stated: "It is merely fortui-
tous from the standpoint of either plaintiff or defendant that the state has chosen
to have plaintiff remedy the contamination problem, rather than choosing to incur
the cost of clean-up itself and then suing plaintiff to recover those costs." Id. The
Sixth Circuit in Ray Industries distinguished the holding in Aviex finding that the
primary issue in Aviex dealt with defining "damages" and not "suit." Ray Industries,
974 F.2d at 763.
99. 496 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted, 506 N.W.2d 877
(Mich. 1993).
100. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 506 N.W.2d 877
(Mich. 1993).
101. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d at 376. The PRP was listed on
the National Priorities List ("NPL") two months after the insured received the PRP
letter. Id. at 375. Michigan Millers Mutual, the PRP's only insurance company to
undertake a defense, soonafter filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to be
absolved from any duty to defend. Id. at 376.
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of Appeals, relying on Polkow v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America,1O2
reversed a trial court's summary disposition and held that receipt of
an EPA PRP letter constituted a "suit."10 3 The court found that as
long as coverage is not excluded under other provisions of the pol-
icy, an insurer has a duty to defend against CERCLA liability
claims.104
B. Federal Courts Finding No Duty to Defend
Several federal courts in other circuits have determined that a
PRP letter, whether sent by EPA or a state environmental agency,
does not trigger the duty to defend. 0 5 For example, in Detrex Chem-
ical Industries, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,'06 the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded that a claim for
damages that may result in legal liability is not the functional
equivalent of a "suit," and therefore does not trigger the duty to
defend. 10 7 The court reasoned that the duty to defend would be
102. 447 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). For further discussion of PoAkow,
see supra note 98.
103. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d at 377.
104. Id. The court noted that the combination of the administrative actions
available to EPA and "the power to expose the insured to a money judgment in a
court of law" lead to the conclusion that an insurer's duty to defend is triggered
upon receipt of a PRP letter. Id. (citing Pokow, 447 N.W.2d at 856).
The sole dissenting judge disagreed that the term "suit" was ambiguous and
reaffirmed the court's unpublished holding in a prior case, City of Evart v. Home
Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1992), which agreed with the Sixth Circuit's Ray
Industries holding that a PRP letter is not the equivalent of a "suit." Id. at 380
(Reilly, J., dissenting).
105. Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1990); Detrex Chem.
Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987), on
reargumen 746 F. Supp. 1310 (1990).
106. 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
107. Detrex, 681 F. Supp. at 446. Detrex sought defense coverage from
Wausan in response to actions taken by various state agencies as well as EPA. Id. at
441. In one of several PRP letters sent to Detrex as a result of investigations into
several waste sites, EPA requested that Detrex voluntarily negotiate and perform
response actions or be liable for an EPA cleanup using federal funds. Id. at 444.
Later, Detrex received another EPA letter advising of the completion of an EPA
conducted RI/FS and requesting negotiation of possible clean-up actions. Id.
The court distinguished Detrex from Aviex based on the fact that the PRP let-
ters in Aviex were from a state agency and not EPA, and no actions were taken
comparable to those in Aviex Id. at 449. The court also refused to follow a Michi-
gan federal district court's determination in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) that the duty to defend was triggered. Id.
In Ex-Cell-O, the district court required the insurer to defend after the insured
received an EPA PRP letter. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. at 74. The letter con-
cerned liability for sixteen hazardous waste sites, some of which EPA had begun to
remediate. Id. The Ex-Cell-O court based its decision requiring the insured to de-
fend on the actual or threatened use of legal means to force an insured to perform
certain actions or pay for EPA actions. Id. at 75.
[Vol. V.- p. 479
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triggered only upon filing of a CERCLA section 106 injunction re-
quest, an administrative order, or a section 107 cost recovery ac-
tion.108 The Detrex court also declared that because the developing
administrative record would be the basis of any future EPA actions,
a PRP's defense costs in adding to the record would be reimburs-
able if EPA eventually filed suit. 10 9 The court avoided defining
"suit," but impliededly agreed with the insurer that the term de-
noted an action in a court of law.110 The court noted that in Detrex,
the three PRP letters received did not obligate the PRP to pay any
money to the government and thus did not create a duty to
indemnify."'
In Ryan v. Royal Insurance Co. of America,1 2 the First Circuit af-
firmed a district court's holding that a state environmental agency's
letter seeking voluntary cooperation with a cleanup sent to an in-
sured plating and painting business did not trigger the insurer's
duty to defend. The Ryan court found no duty to defend because
the letter lacked coerciveness and did not represent a serious state
enforcement effort. 1 3 The court rejected a bright-line standard
and instead determined that any analysis of the issue must focus
"on the data most relevant to the probability of actual toxic waste
liability: coerciveness, adversariness, the seriousness of the effort
Detrex also sought indemnification from Wausau of costs incurred in cleaning
up a hazardous waste site in Kentucky. Detrex, 681 F. Supp. at 451. This suit in-
volved an action by Kentucky's National Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet for injunctive relief to compel Detrex to clean up the site. Id. The court
stated that the first requirement of the duty to defend, the existence of a "suit," was
satisfied by the suit for injunctive relief. Id. However, the second requirement, that
Detrex be liable for "damages on account of... property damages" was not satis-
fied because suits for equitable relief are generally outside the scope of an in-
surer's duty to defend. Id. The civil penalties sought by the State were for Detrex's
failure to comply and not compensation for damages, as there was no evidence of
actual property damage. Id. at 451-52.
108. Id. at 446. On reconsideration, the court reaffirmed that EPA remedial
orders, issued pursuant to CERCLA §§ 9604 or 9606, trigger an insurer's duty to
defend. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 746 F. Supp. 1310,
1316 (N.D. Ohio 1990). Because the district court was interpreting Michigan law,
by the time the Detrex court reconsidered the issues originally decided in 1987, the
Michigan courts had exhaustively debated the issue of whether receipt of a PRP
letter triggered an insurer's duty to defend. See supra notes 98-104.
109. Detrex, 681 F. Supp. at 447.
110. Id at 445.
111. Id. at 446.
112. 916 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1990).
113. Id. at 741. In reviewing the state PRP letters, the court stated that "It]he
communications patenly lack[ed] any significant indicia of adversariness. In none
of the letters does NYDEC use hortatory terminology." Id. at 742. The court also
noted that NYDEC letters do not mention a "demand" or an "order." Id.
1994]
19
Liebesman: Triggering an Obligation: Receipt of an EPA PRP Letter and an Ins
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
498 VILIANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. V: p. 4 7 9
with which the government hounds an insured, and the gravity of
imminent consequences."" 14
C. Federal Courts Finding A Duty to Defend
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit ruled that EPA administrative claims
can trigger an insurer's duty to defend.115 After receiving an EPA
PRP letter, the recipient in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pintlar
Corp. negotiated with EPA to complete an RI/FS and, pursuant to a
subsequent administrative consent order, agreed to perform and
pay for the RI/FS.116 The Pintlar court evaluated the consequences
and administrative threats associated with a PRP letter and con-
cluded that a PRP letter indicates a likelihood of legal action."17
The court noted that receipt of a PRP letter brings "immediate and
severe implications" because "[g]enerally, a party asserting a claim
can do nothing between the occurrence of the tort and the filing of
the complaint that can adversely affect the insureds' rights"; how-
ever, with the administrative processes available under CERCLA,
EPA can significantly affect a PRP's "substantive rights and ultimate
liability.""18 The court recognized the significance of a PRP letter:
The extent of CERCLA liability is far-reaching. The ability
to choose the response action greatly empowers the gov-
ernment. In order to influence the nature and costs of
the environmental studies and cleanup measures, the PRP
must get involved from the outset. In many instances, it is
114. Id. at 741. The court acknowledged that CERCLA's strict liability pro-
vided some certainty to the possibility of PRP liability. Id. However, the court
noted that "there must be some cognizable degree of coerciveness or adversariness
in the administrative body's actions." Id. at 738. The First Circuit distinguished
other cases interpreting New York law based on the nature and extent of the ac-
tions taken against the PRPs. Id.; see also Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding duty to de-
fend not triggered by EPA PRP letter requesting participation), affd on other
grounds, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (NY 1989); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding state PRP letter triggered duty to defend in
light of adversarial posture of letter), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). For further
discussion of Avondale, see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
115. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir.
1991) (interpreting Idaho law).
116. Id. at 1509-10. The PRP sought defense and indemnification from the
insurance company, which refused and brought declaratory judgment actions. Id.
at 1510.
117. Id. at 1518. "The focus should be on the underlying rationale and not
on the formalistic rituals. If the threat is clear then coverage should be provided.
The filing of an administrative claim is a clear signal that legal action is at hand."
Id.
118. Pintlar, 948 F.2d at 1516 (citing Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
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more prudent for the PRP to take the environmental stud-
ies and cleanup measures itself than to await the EPA's
subsequent.suit in a cost recovery action." 9
The court considered the insured's reasonable expectations and
concluded that "receipt of a PRP notice is the effective commence-
ment of a 'suit' necessitating a legal defense.' 20 Furthermore, the
Pintlar court reasoned that if the duty to defend does not arise until
a suit is filed, PRPs may attempt to instigate a suit, thus guarantee-
ing coverage and a defense, by being uncooperative with EPA.121
In Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the Second
Circuit decided that receipt of a state environmental agency PRP
letter constituted a suit where the PRP letter: (1) advised of the
agency's plans to clean up a site and recover the costs from the
PRP; (2) demanded that the PRP submit to a remedial action plan;
(3) requested information regarding the site; and (4) warned of
possible penalties for failing to comply with the foregoing orders. 22
The court viewed the PRP letter as a demand letter which techni-
cally began formal proceedings against the PRP. According to the
court, the letter created an "adversarial posture," and threatened
possible penalty actions that "[could] result in the loss of substantial
rights" by the PRP.123 The court found these actions to be "the
hallmarks of litigation" and "sufficiently adversarial to constitute a
SUit" 124
D. State Courts Analyzing the Issue
1. State Courts Finding a Duty to Defend
State courts have also split on whether the receipt of a PRP
notice letter triggers the duty to defend. 25 In Coakley Landfill, Inc.
119. Id. at 1517.
120. Id. As a result of the PRP letter, the PRP incurred technical expert ex-
penses. Id.
121. Id. For further discussion of delay tactics that instigate further adver-
sarial posturing by EPA, see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
122. 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir. 1989).
123. Id.
124. Id. The Avondale court adopted an analysis similar to that used by the
First Circuit in Ryan v. Royal Insurance Co. by considering the wording of the letters
and determining their coercive and adversarial nature. If the letter merely re-
quests information or participation in conducting remedial actions, then the duty
to defend will not be triggered because the letter would not be considered the
equivalent of a "suit." Id. The court distinguished Technicon Electronics Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co, 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) by showing the lack of coerciveness in the PRP letter.
125. See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475
N.E.2d 607 (Iowa 1991) (finding duty to defend); Professional Rental, Inc. v.
1994] 499
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v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found that the PRP letter in question gave rise to a duty to
defend.' 26 The court acknowledged that the term "suit" was not
defined in the policy, and that the language used in the policy dis-
tinguished between a "suit" and a "claim."127 For the court, this
distinction was significant because a suit is more adverse to a PRP
than a claim.12 8 The court used a dictionary definition of "suit" to
ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, and found
the appropriate definition to be "the attempt to gain an end by
legal process." 2 9 The court concluded that because the notice let-
ter advised the PRP that "EPA had begun a legal process to conclu-
sively and legally determine, subject only to review for abuse of
discretion . . . the appropriate 'response activities' liable parties
must perform or pay for," the insurer had an obligation to defend
the PRP.130
In A. Y. McDonald Industries v. Insurance Co. of North America,'3l
the Iowa Supreme Court defined "suit" to include PRP letters.' 32
The court distiguished an EPA demand letter from a "conven-
Shelby Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to impose the
obligation of a defense without injunctive proceedings); Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Mass. 1990) (noting prejudice to in-
sured if no duty found); C. D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft &
Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557, 569 (N.C. 1990) (relying on liberal insurance contract
interpretations); Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 20 (Me.
1990) (finding no duty to defend).
126. Coakley Landfill, Inc. v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 618 A.2d 777
(N.H. 1992). After discovery of contaminants closed the landfill, the state environ-
mental agency notified the owner of the need to cooperate with officials in con-
ducting the RI/FS. Id. at 779. The owner failed to cooperate and EPA performed
the RI/FS itself at a cost in excess of $1.2 million. Id. First, EPA sent a CERCLA
§ 104(e) "Request for Information" to the owner, and later sent a "Notice of Po-
tential Liability." Id. This second letter warned of potential liabilities associated
with being a PRP and demanded the PRP compensate EPA for the $1.2 million
spent on the RI/FS. Id.
127. Id. at 786. The court agreed with the insurer's differentiation of the
terms, but did not agree that the actions taken by EPA were merely claims as de-
fined by the policy. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing WEBTmR's DICIONARY).
130. Id. The EPA action did not involve deciding whether a PRP is liable, but
rather the extent to which it is liable. Id. The court held that the state's environ-
mental agency's issuance of an administrative order requiring the PRP to perform
certain remedial actions also satisfied the "suit" requirement. Id. at 787. According
to the court, an administrative order indicates the presence of an administrative
proceeding. Id.
131. 475 N.W.2d 607, 627 (Iowa 1991).
132. Id. The court defined "suit" as "any attempt to gain an end by legal
process." Id. (citing WEBSrTR's THID NEw INTRNATIONAL DIraroNAY 2286 (P.
Gove ed. 1961)).
[Vol. V. p. 479
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tional" demand letter in that the PRP recipient faces far more seri-
ous consequences than a recipient of a "conventional" demand
letter.8 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court in C.D. Spangler Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Engineering Co.13 4 similarly
used the broad definition of "suit" adopted in A.Y McDonald.135 In
Spangler, the state environmental agency required the insured to de-
velop a plan similar to EPA's RI/FS. The agency later served a com-
pliance order requiring clean-up action.136 The Spangler court held
that the compliance order constituted a "suit" under the CGL pol-
icy involved. The court found the issuing of compliance orders to
be an attempt "to gain an end by legal process."1 37
2. State Courts Finding No Duty to Defend
In Professional Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Insurance Co.,' 38 the Ohio
Court of Appeals determined that although an EPA PRP letter re-
flects the agency's "confrontational and seemingly coercive" strat-
egy, receipt of a PRP letter alone does not trigger an insurer's duty
to defend.' 3 9 The court reasoned that further agency action, such
as the issuance of an administrative order or the filing of a cost
recovery action, was necessary to invoke the duty.140 Although the
PRP received three PRP letters from EPA, each increasingly de-
manding and adversarial, 141 the Professional Rental court concluded
that those notifications were " 'claims' of liability and demands for
133. Id. at 628-29. The court noted that EPA's actions extended beyond the
demand letter and in fact EPA had filed a complaint and a compliance order
against the insured. Id. at 629.
134. 388 S.E.2d 557, 570 (N.C. 1990).
135. Id. at 570 (noting not all definitions of "suit" require court proceedings).
136. Id. at 559.
137. Id. at 570. The court also acknowledged the consideration given to the
reasonable expectations of an insured. The court concluded that a reasonable
person in the insured's position may not have realized that the term limited the
insurer's duty to defend to require the filing of a complaint in a court or some
form of adjudicatory proceeding. Id.
138. 599 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
139. Id. at 430.
140. Id.
141. Professional Rental Inc.'s ("PRI") first notice requested voluntary
remediation. According to that letter, if PRI refused, it risked being responsible
for the cost of any government undertakings in removing the waste. Id. at 425. A
second PRP "Special Notice" letter, received twenty months later, demanded resti-
tution for costs incurred by EPA and gave PRI a short time to enter into "good
faith" negotiations with EPA to continue clean up efforts. Id. Three months later,
EPA sent PRI a letter requesting payment in excess of $3.6 million for costs in-
curred. Id.
1994]
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restitution - coupled with threats of unilateral action," but were not
the functional equivalent of a suiL1 42
State versions of CERCLA contain provisions which further
complicate the issue of an insurer's duty to defend in this context.
For instance, in Patrons Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marois,'43 the
Maine Supreme Court held that a state environmental agency's let-
ter naming the insured as a PRP accompanied by a cleanup order
did not constitute a suit. The court reasoned that although the
state was authorized to compel cleanup, it was statutorily unable to
recover damages and, therefore, the action did not constitute a
suit.144 Under Maine law, however, the state can recover money
paid out of a fund allocated to pay for a hazardous waste cleanup by
referring the matter to the state's attorney general for collection. 145
The Marois court implied that the duty to defend would be trig-
gered if the state followed that procedure. 146
Courts must also contend with situations in which both EPA
and a state environmental agency issue PRP notices (or a functional
equivalent) to the same PRP. Currently, state court opinions are
split on which notice, if either, triggers a duty to defend. In Hazen
Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,147 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court found that an EPA notice letter triggered the in-
surer's duty to defend, while the state agency's notice letter did not,
because of EPA's assertion that actual releases had occurred. 48
The court emphasized that the state notice simply advised of a
threatened release. 149 To the court, EPA's use of administrative pro-
cedures rather than the judicial system would compromise an in-
sured's defense if a duty to defend were not imposed.' 50 The court
concluded that "[t] he consequences of the receipt of the EPA letter
142. Id. at 430.
143. 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
144. Id. at 20.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990).
148. Id. at 580.
149. Id. The PRP letter sent by EPA indicated a desire to discuss "voluntary
involvement" in remedying the contamination. Id. However, the letter continued
to say that "the only form of voluntary involvement" EPA would allow was the PRP's
'commitment to complete implementation of all the measures needed... and
reimbursement of the expenses already incurred by EPA" and the state's environ-
mental agency. Id.
150. Id. at 581.
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were so substantially equivalent to the commencement of a lawsuit
that a duty to defend arose immediately."151
In City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,15 2 the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals held that a CERCLA section 104(e) Information Re-
quest did not trigger the insurer's duty to defend, but a state en-
forcement letter did. The court held that the state agency's letter
meant that either the PRP must perform the remedial cleanup ac-
tion or the site would be listed on the NPL or the PRP would bear
the expenses of a cleanup.' 5 3 Conversely, EPA's Information Re-
quest required only completion of the questionnaire. 54 The Edger-
ton court adopted the reasoning in Ryan v. Royal Insurance Co.' 55
and held that the duty to defend is triggered when an identified
PRP is unequivocally required to pay costs associated with a hazard-
ous waste site cleanup. 156
IV. ANALYsIs
Satisfying CERCLA objectives' 57 requires the cooperation of
several parties including EPA, PRPs and their respective insurance
companies. Presently, many courts focus on the wording of PRP
letters to determine the degree of adversity present between EPA or
a state agency and the PRP.158 In light of this, and given EPA's
emphasis on aggressive CERCLA enforcement,'5 9 EPA may try to
word PRP letters in a way that an insurer's duty to defend will
clearly be triggered. This result would further the goals of CERCLA
because the insured is more likely to cooperate with EPA. Other-
wise, what often occurs is that PRPs without insurer-provided legal
defense are less likely to cooperate with EPA. Instead, these PRPs
investigate and pursue every conceivable option in an attempt to
151. Id. For further discussion of EPA enforcement policies, see supra notes
53-57 and accompanying text. The court also noted the effect of imposition of
strict and joint and several liability under CERCLA. Id.
152. 493 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 771. Both of these options entail considerable expense.
154. Id.
155. For a discussion of Ryan v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, see notes 112-14
and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 775. The court balanced broad definition approaches against
those approaches which strictly defined "suit" to require the initiation of a court
proceeding. Id.
157. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200,
1206 (2d cir. 1989); City of Edgerton, 493 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
159. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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avoid financial responsibility for the cleanup. These attempts frus-
trate CERCLA's objective of prompt removal of hazardous waste.
One method of avoiding liability involves PRPs not responding
to EPA notices and not cooperating in any investigation into poten-
tial CERCLA liability. Through this strategy, the PRP hopes to re-
ceive either a more threatening adversarial notice or trigger the
filing of an EPA or Department of Justice complaint. 160 In either
case, the triggering of the insurer's duty to defend would at least be
more likely. One increasingly common method involves seeking
contribution from the small companies and municipalities that
have also dumped hazardous substances at the waste site.' 61 In one
case, a group of PRPs at a waste site under EPA investigation sought
contribution from other companies and municipalities that had de-
posited small amounts of waste and allegedly raised so much money
from settling with these companies that the targeted group of PRPs
only had to pay a minimal amount for the entire cleanup effort.162
Predictably, this procedure is becoming increasingly popular. 163
This tactic results from the perception of large companies that
EPA unfairly targets them because of their size and financial re-
sources.'6 Many critics of CERCLA complain that the cost of nego-
tiating and litigating CERCLA violations is disproportional to the
actual cleanup expenditures. Critics are concerned that while the
parties litigate, the hazardous waste site continues to threaten the
public health and welfare and the environment. 65 This argument
clearly applies to disputes between insurers and insureds.
160. Several courts have acknowledged this tactical possibility and noted that
a PRP prolongs the cleanup process to the detriment of the environment, the pub-
lic and adds costs to the cleanup. See e.g., Coakley Landfill, Inc. v. Maine Bonding
& Casualty Co., 618 A.2d 777, 784 (N.H. 1992). This is also contingent on the
inapplicability of exclusions in other parts of the insurance policy.
161. CERCLA specifically authorizes contribution. See CERCLA § 113(f) (1),
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1).
162. See Mike Williams and Wylie Gerdes, Companies that Sent Toxics to a Rural
Landfill Try to Bill Small Towns and Little Firms, DETrOIT FREE PRESS (March 20,
1992) NWS section, at Al. In one case, two PRPs involved in a New York state
hazardous waste site cleanup threatened 603 smaller businesses and organizations,
forcing 85% of them to settle for a total of $2 million. 32 ENv'T WK. (Aug. 12,
1993).
163. 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 193 (May 28, 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse survey
showing two year increase in recovering from other PRPs from 29 to 80 percent).
164. See 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) d23 (Oct. 4, 1993). Usually, only large,
solvent companies are targeted as PRPs, forcing some to turn to contribution from
parties not targeted by government agencies. Id. For a discussion of EPA guidance
on the consideration of PRP financial viability, see supra note 13.
165. Id. (citing Office of Technology estimates that out of every dollar spent
by the U.S. government on Superfund, 44 percent goes to administrative and liti-
gation costs, 16 percent to site studies, and remaining 40 percent is spent on
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V. CONCLUSION
The split among federal and state courts as to when an in-
surer's duty to defend is triggered illustrates the need to resolve the
issue presented when a "person" receives a PRP letter. Insurance
companies should be expected to defend PRPs who paid for insur-
ance to protect themselves against environmental liability. The
United States Supreme Court should take advantage of the next
appeal dealing with an insurer's duty to defend a PRP to resolve
this issue. Congress should also take steps to amend CERCLA to
fulfill the statute's objectives and resolve this issue and others which
create unnecessary CERCLA litigation. 166
Sidney S. Liebesman
cleanup). Insurance companies also expend large sums of money for litigatation
costs associated with Superfund liability. SeeJan Paul Acton & Lloyd S. Dixon, The
Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation, Superfund and Transaction Costs: The
Experiences of Insurers and Veiy Large Industrial Firms, 1992 (finding 88 percent of
Superfund expenditures made by insurance companies and 34 percent of the ex-
penditures of five large industrial PRPs, were used for transaction costs including
the costs used to resolve CERCLA negotiations); Supeifund Pollution Claims, U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO/Rced-92-45R, October 14, 1992) (citing large
Superfund indemnity payments by insurance companies).
166. The programs and fundings authorized in the 1986 SARA amendments
were to have expired in five years. Congress extended that expiration another
three years with expiration to occur on September 30, 1994. Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1388, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 6301, 1388-319 (1990).
In preparation for the reauthorization, a Congressional subcommittee has pro-
nounced possible reforms to reduce Superfund liability litigation including- pro-
moting alternative dispute resolutions through arbitration and mediation,
promoting the use of de minimis settlements and allocating costs through the use
of "nonbinding allocation of responsibility (NBAR) agreements." ADMINISTRATION
OF THE FEDERAL SUPERFUND PROGRAM, REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC WoRuS AND TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Rep.
No. 103-35, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 11 (November 1993) [hereinafter Subcomm.
Report] (suggesting EPA promote the allocation of costs of PRPs to reduce litiga-
tion costs and expedite Superfund cleanups). The imposition of strict, joint and
several, and retroactive liability on PRPs must also be considered by Congress. It is
the unknown and possible inequitable costs potentially facing PRPs that prolong
negotiations. Commentators have suggested that Congress should expressly elimi-
nate the imposition ofjoint and several liability and instead entrust the power to
fairly allocate the amount of liability to the courts. See, e.g., Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA)
d23 (Oct. 4, 1993).
A Congressional subcommittee has also opted to avoid interfering with in-
surer liability by the preempting of state insurance laws, noting insurers are regu-
lated by individual states, therefore placing insurance contract interpretations on
state courts. See Subcomm. Report, supra, at 181. The committee-suggested alter-
native methods may reduce PRPs and insurers' Superfund clean-up liabilities, but
those methods were not sufficient reasons to change liability under Superfund be-
cause transaction costs may always be reduced by negotiating settlements with EPA.
Id. at 182.
The opportunity to change the liability scheme under CERCLA is ripe. In
February 1994, the proposed bill to amend CERCLA was introduced and includes
1994] 505
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various methods aimed at making Superfund more effective. See Proposed
Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (February 7, 1994);
see also 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1755 (February 11, 1994) (listing proposals from Carol
Browner, Administrator of EPA when testifying before Congressional subcommit-
tee). One proposal includes taxing commercial insurance companies to create a
fund that would be used to settle Superfund litigation for cleanup costs prior to
1986. See Superfund Reform Act, supra, Title VIII - Environmental Insurance Reso-
lution Fund. See also 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1755, supra(expressing tax fund of $3.1
billion to be created over a five year period).
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